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Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Larry Smith and his wife were married in 1975 and separated in
1979.1 Mrs. Smith filed for divorce and obtained a temporary restraining order which enjoined each party from molesting, interfering with or harassing the other.2 After issuance of the order, but
before the divorce action became final, Mrs. Smith alleged that she
was confronted by her husband in the parking lot of the apartment
complex where she resided.' After being grabbed and ordered to
accompany her husband, Mrs. Smith sprayed him with mace. Mr.
Smith then knocked his wife to the ground, took the mace from
her, dragged her into his car and drove off. While driving, Mr.
Smith ordered his wife to undress and threatened to beat her if she
refused. Mrs. Smith undressed and was forced to engage in sexual
intercourse.4
After gaining her freedom, Mrs. Smith charged her husband with
kidnapping and sexual battery.6 The defendant moved to dismiss
the sexual battery count on the ground that he was lawfully married to the victim at the time of the offense and the common law
interspousal rape exception precluded his prosecution on the
charge." The circuit court granted the defendant's motion, but the
Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.7 In so doing, the district
court rejected a common law principle first expressed in the 1600's
which presumably was the undisputed law in Florida prior to the
Smith decision.8 The common law exception, as expressed by Sir
1. State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
2. Id. at 1127.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see infra, text accompanying notes 18-28.
6. 401 So. 2d at 1127.
7. Id. at 1129.
8. Although there is no reported Florida decision which holds that marriage of the parties is a valid defense to a rape action, there is likewise no decision prior to Smith holding
that it is not. In Blount v. State, 138 So. 2 (Fla. 1931), the Florida Supreme Court held that
subsequent marriage of the parties was not a defense to rape.
Despite statutory silence on the issue, it has nevertheless been generally assumed that the
exception had been in force in Florida prior to Smith. See, e.g., Note, Florida's Sexual
Battery Statute: Significant Reform But Bias Against the Victim Still Prevails, 30 U. FLA.
L. REV. 419, 429 (1978).
In debate before the House Committee on Criminal Justice, Rep. Elaine Gordon proposed
an amendment to the present sexual battery statute which would have explicitly eliminated
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Matthew Hale, is that "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."9 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal, by rejecting Hale's assertion and holding
that a husband could be prosecuted for the sexual battery of his
wife, joined the minority of jurisdictions which have totally rejected the common law exception.
This note will discuss the probable effects of Smith and review
the justifications for the common law exception. An examination of
the statutory and sociological changes which influenced the Fifth
District Court of Appeal's decision will be made, followed by a discussion of the trend toward abolishing the interspousal exception.
II. THE COMMON LAW EXCEPTION
Although Hale's exposition of the common law exception was
made more than 300 years ago, the reasoning he employed remains
a major justification of the rule today. What Hale spoke of as the
wife having "given up herself" has developed into the concept of
"implied consent" to intercourse.' 0 The theory that marriage carries with it the consent to intercourse is employed even today by
those who support the exception."
Aside from the theory of implied consent, three other notions
have traditionally been posited in favor of the interspousal rape
exception. The first, that a wife is the chattel of her husband, was
never accepted in this country, 12 although it was probably a basic
underpinning of the rule at the time of its inception.1"
The exception was also at one time supported by the common
law principle that a husband and wife constituted but one legal
entity."' Therefore, to prosecute a man for the rape of his wife
would be identical to prosecuting him for committing a crime
against himself.' 5
the interspousal exception. Because of vehement opposition, the proposal was dropped. Id.
at 429 n.83.
9. 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1736).
10. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 25 So. 372 (La. 1899); Frazier v. State, 86 S.W. 754 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1905).
11. See Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 31, 41 (1980).
12. 401 So. 2d at 1128.
13. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 18-28 (1975).

14. E.g., H.

CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS

219 (1968).

15. Cf. W. HEALE, AN APOLOGIE FOR WOMEN 6 (1609). The "one legal entity" theory,
however, ignores the fact that a husband has traditionally been held criminally liable for
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The final justification for the interspousal exception was that to
allow interspousal prosecutions would divide the home and that judicial intervention would cause more disharmony than it would
rectify. This notion, like implied consent, retains vitality even today.16 A closely related and sometimes indistinguishable concern is
that the opening of a judicial avenue of redress would lead to a
flood of prosecutions brought by vengeful or retributive spouses.
Under this theory, it is thought better to allow husbands and wives
to resolve their conflicts within the home than to have the police
and courts intrude into that most protected "zone of privacy."1
III.

FLORIDA SEXUAL BATTERY STATUTE

Prior to 1974, the Florida rape statute provided:
(1)

Whoever of the age of seventeen years or older unlawfully

ravishes or carnally knows a child under the age of eleven is
guilty of a capital felony ....
(2) Whoever ravishes or carnally knows a person of the age of
eleven years or more, by force and against his or her will, or unlawfully and carnally knows and abuses a child under the age of
eleven years, shall be guilty of a life felony ....
(3) It shall not be necessary to prove the actual emission of
seed, but the crime shall be deemed complete upon proof of pene-

tration only.18

Although the rape statute was upheld against a claim of unconstitutional vagueness in 1974,19 the Florida Legislature repealed it
that same year. 20 The current sexual battery statute was enacted in
its place. 2 1 The practical effect of this exchange was to abolish the
crime of rape in Florida and to replace it with the broader crime of
sexual battery.2 2
Generally, the effect of the sexual battery statute was to bring all
certain crimes committed against his wife. See generally, 6 AM.
§ 44 (1972).
16. See generally Hilf, supra note 11.
17. Id.

JUR.

2d Assault and Battery

18.

FLA. STAT.

19.
20.

Washington v. State, 302 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 918 (1975).
1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-121, § 1.

§ 794.01 (1973).

21.

FLA. STAT.

§ 794.011 (1981).

22. The scope of this note prohibits an in-depth analysis of the changes brought about
by the enactment of the sexual battery statute. For an excellent analysis of this topic see
Note, supra note 8.

INTERSPOUSAL SEXUAL BATTERY

1982]

nonconsensual sex crimes under one title.

3

In contrast to the prior

definition of rape, "sexual battery" is defined as "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or
the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object;
however, sexual battery shall not include acts done for bona fide
medical purposes.""'
Thus, the Legislature replaced the ambiguous language of the
rape statute with a more precise definition of punishable behavior.
Additionally, the sexual battery statute is gender neutral, encompassing acts between men or between women as well as between
men and women."

The sexual battery statute divides sexual battery into three
grades of offenses, whereas the rape statute allowed only for capital and life felonies. Sexual battery or attempted sexual battery by
a person over eighteen committed upon a child eleven or younger,
remains a capital felony.2 6 Nonconsensual sexual battery upon a
person over the age of eleven, which is accomplished through the
threatened use of a deadly weapon or use of "actual physical force
likely to cause serious personal injury," is classified as a life felony. Finally, the sexual battery statute includes the classification
of first degree felony for nonconsensual sexual battery upon a person over the age of eleven:
(a) When the victim is physically helpless to resist.
(b) When the offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence ....

and the victim reasonably

believes that the offender has the present ability to execute these
threats.
(c)

When the offender coerces the victim . . .by threatening

to retaliate against the victim ....
(d) When the offender. . . administers.. . to the victim any
narcotic ... which mentally or physically incapacitates the

victim.
(e)

When the victim is . . .less than 18 years of age and the

offender is in a position of familial, custodial, or official authority
over the victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to
23. Id. at 421-26.
24. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(l)(f) (1981).
25.
26.

401 So. 2d at 1129.
FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2) (1981); but see Coler v. State, 7 Fla. L.W. 245 (1982) (death

penalty for sexual battery of a child eleven years or younger unconstitutional); Buford v.
State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981) (death penalty for sexual battery forbidden by eighth
amendment).

27. Id. § 794.011(3).
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submit.
(f) When the victim is mentally defective ..
Comparison of the past and present sexual offense statutes
reveals two alterations critical to the Smith decision. First, the sexomits language requiring that the offender act
ual battery statute
"unlawfully. ' 29 Although the "unlawful" language was present only
in the definition of offenses against children under eleven, it was
assumed that this language was employed to assert the existence of
the interspousal exception.30 Since sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not "unlawful," a husband could not be prosecuted for the rape of his wife under the rape statute.3 '
Second, inclusion in the sexual battery statute of the lesser offense of first degree sexual battery may have influenced the Fifth
District Court of Appeal's reversal of the trial court as well as the
state attorney's initial decision to prosecute. The dearth of previous case law in this area may be attributed as much to each assistant state attorney's discretion as it is to the presumed existence of
an interspousal exception. The inclusion in the rape statute of only
two grades of offenses-capital and life felony-required a state
attorney to carry a heavy burden of persuasion to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.3 2 In the case of interspousal rape, that
burden may well have been seen as virtually insurmountable. As a
result, the complaining spouse probably found that no charges
were filed at all or that the offense was downgraded to something
in the nature of simple assault and battery.
The enactment of the sexual battery statute in 1974 and a
changing societal awareness of the legal rights of married women
are two of the factors which led the Fifth District Court of Appeal
to abandon any presumption of an interspousal exception in
Florida.

IV.

THE FIFTH DISTRICT'S REJECTION OF THE COMMON LAW
EXCEPTION

On appeal, the defendant's main contention in support of the
trial court's dismissal of the sexual battery count was the "implied
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. § 794.011(4)(a)-(f).
FLA. STAT. § 794.01(1) (1973).
See, e.g., Note, supra note 8.
Id. at 429; see generally 65 AM. JUR. 2d Rape § 39 (1972).
See Note, supra note 8, at 425.
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consent" theory first expressed by Hale." The court summarized
the defendant's argument by stating:
The exception argued by appellee does not affect the definition
of the crime but rather challenges the existence of an element of
that crime, lack of consent. In other words, the statute may apply
to any person but the husband's forcible sexual intercourse with
his wife would not constitute a violation thereof because an element of the crime, lack of consent, could not be established."
To term the Fifth District's rejection of this contention unqualified would hardly be an exercise in overstatement. Borrowing from
a New Jersey case coincidentally styled State v. Smith," the court
refutes the logic and historical basis for the common law principle.
Quoting in part from the New Jersey decision, the court ilustrates how changes in the nature of marriage have undermined any
validity which Hale's principle may once have enjoyed:
[The] implied matrimonial consent theory was formulated under
vastly different conditions, when the matrimonial vow and hence
concomitantly implied consent to conjugal rights were not retractable. However, concepts of marriage and divorce have clearly
evolved and in Smith the court declared:
The rule may simply not have been applicable to revocable
marriages, which exist today as a result of changes in divorce laws. The fact that many jurisdictions have mechanically applied the rule, without evaluating its merits under
changed conditions, does not mean that such blind application was part of the principles of the common law adopted
in this State. Without deciding whether an exemption existed in any situations at all, we think it was not meant to
exist during the entire legal duration of a marriage. Therefore, we decline to apply mechanically a rule whose existence
is in some doubt and which may never have been intended
to apply to the factual situation presented by this case."
The Fifth District Court of Appeal did not limit its holding to
those factual situations where a divorce action is pending, the
couple is separated and judicial decrees are imposed to control
33.
34.
35.
36.

See
401
426
401

text accompanying supra note 9.
So. 2d at 1127.
A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981).
So. 2d at 1128, quoting in part from 426 A.2d at 43.
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their interaction. 7 The court determined that "to rest the decision
on this factor alone would require an assumption that the common
law exception still exists. We reject such a contention." 8
The court's rejection of the second and third historical justifications for the exception was equally absolute. The court noted that
the ancient principle that the wife is merely a chattel of her husband was never given credence in the United States. 9 Likewise,
the court pointed out, the concept that a husband and wife are but
one legal entity and are therefore immune to accusation by each
other was judicially abrogated in Florida. 0
The defendant also raised the fourth and final articulated justification for the rule-the venerable floodgate argument. That is, rejection of the common law exception would result in a flurry of
prosecutions brought by vengeful wives seeking to obtain better
bargaining positions in impending divorce settlements. 41 The court
in rejecting this contention interpreted the sexual battery statute
as evidence that:
[T]he people of this state no longer will tolerate a violent assault,
sexual or otherwise, upon one another. Clearly, no person in this
state can justifiably claim a legal right to impose his or her sexual
will upon another person, including
his or her spouse, over that
4
person's unmistakable objection.

1

Implicit in the floodgate argument raised by the defendant is the
notion that judicial intervention in the affairs of husband and wife
violates the penumbral right of marital privacy guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. Although not raised by the defendant
nor addressed by the court, the use of this principle to support an
immunity from criminal liability for spousal sexual battery is a
misguided application of this judicially recognized constitutional
right. In acknowledging the right to marital privacy in Griswold v.
Connecticut,43 Justice Douglas stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights
37. 401 So. 2d at 1129.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1128.
40. Id., citing Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969); State v. Herndon, 27 So. 2d
833 (Fla. 1946).
41. 401 So. 2d at 1129.
42. Id.
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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....
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life .
, a harmony in living
*

. . ,

a bilateral loyalty . .

.

It is critical to note that the marital privacy right recognized in

Griswold was designed to prevent state intrusion upon "the freedoms of married persons" to make choices concerning their home
life. 45 There is no "freedom" to sexually batter one's spouse, and to

assert "marital privacy" as justification for immunity from prosecution is erroneous for two reasons. First, the right to privacy is
based on a determination by each partner to the marriage that cer-

tain matters should not be subject to disclosure or interference. In
a sexual battery case, however, the right to privacy is claimed by
one spouse over the objection of the other." Flowing from this, the
second erroneous and rather cavalier assumption is that the assaulting spouse's right to privacy is superior to the injured spouse's
right to protection.47
Aside from being distinguishable from the privacy right recognized in Griswold, the real fallacy of attempting to apply this right
to the area of spousal sexual battery is that such application in no
way "promotes . . . a harmony in living . . . [or] a bilateral loy-

alty." 48 It does, however, promote a "way of life"-a way of life in
which intrafamily violence sets in motion a chain of violence
within and beyond the family.49 Therefore, the argument that the
interspousal exception is supported by the right to marital privacy
is as erroneous and inapplicable as those arguments expressly rejected by the court.
The Smith decision unequivocally rejects the interspousal sexual
battery exception. Unlike many jurisdictions, the Fifth District
Court of Appeal does not limit its holding to cases involving legal
separation of the parties or impending divorce. 50 Pending the Flor44. Id. at 486.
45. Id. at 507 (White, J., concurring).
46. Cf. Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980) (in dealing with the marital facts
testimonial privilege, the Court held that apart from confidential communications, the witness spouse alone holds the privilege to refuse to testify and that privilege may not be asserted for her by the accused spouse).
47. See, Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CAL. L.
REV. 1657, 1658-63.
48. 381 U.S. at 486.
49. R. GIL, SOCIETAL VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY

50.

(J. Elkelaar & S. Katz eds. 1978).

See infra notes 55-58.
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ida Supreme Court's treatment of the issue, the Smith decision establishes Florida as a member of the progressive minority of jurisdictions which have rejected this antiquated and unwarranted
principle of the common law.
V.

THE TREND TOWARD ABOLISHING THE INTERSPOUSAL
EXCEPTION

The New Jersey and Florida Smith decisions indicate a trend
toward abolishing the common law exception. Interspousal sexual
assault first gained national attention in State v. Rideout, where
Greta Rideout brought charges against her husband John under
the Oregon sexual assault statute, which had been amended in
1977 to omit the spousal immunity clause.5 1 Although John

Rideout was acquitted, the case sensitized the general public and
state legislatures to the previously concealed problem of marital
rape.
Along with Oregon, seven other states have legislatively abolished the interspousal exception. 2 Seventeen states retain the exception, either explicitly in their statutes,"3 or simply by codifying
the common law definition of rape (and consequently the common
law interpretation of the crime)."
Between the two extremes, the presumption of immunity disappears at different times during the marriage dissolution process.
Eleven states 5 follow the Model Penal Code approach wherein the
51. No. 108,866, Marion County Circuit Court (Or. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.335
(1977).
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1980); DL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 772(b) (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 22 (1980); NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-319.02.04 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:145(b) (West 1981).
53. ALA. CODE § 13-A-6-60(4) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406(A) (1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-67(b) (West 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(a) (1975); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 252 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT. §
(1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111
(1981); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 21.02(a)
(Vernon 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040 (1981);
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(7) (1977).

566.030

54.

GA. CODE

§ 26-2001 (1978).

(1981).
55. Ky. REV. STAT.

MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 97-3-65 (1972);

VA. CODE

§ 18.2-61

§ 510.010(3) (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-41 (West 1978); MD.
CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 464(d) (1982); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-506(2) (1973); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.00(4)(b) (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-01(2) (1973); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3103 (1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658
(1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (1978); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-307 (1977).
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exception remains until a decree of separation has been issued.56
Seven states apply the exception until an action for divorce or separation has been filed.5 7 In five other states the immunity is dispelled if the parties are living apart.5 8 Perhaps the most perverse
example of legislative line drawing 'is in Hawaii, where first degree
rape excludes from its coverage victims who in the previous thirty
days had permitted their attacker "sexual contact." 59
Overall, these figures indicate that a majority of American jurisdictions recognize that the interspousal exception should not be
mechanically applied without regard to the circumstances of the
parties. Even though only eight jurisdictions have totally abolished
the exception,60 twenty-four have limited its application to certain
circumstances. The efforts of these jurisdictions represent an attempt to balance the injured spouse's right to a remedy with the
admittedly legitimate concerns for marital privacy and the possibility of false prosecutions. Unfortunately, seventeen jurisdictions
continue to cling to a 300-year-old common law rule which long
ago lost its applicability and logical underpinnings.

VI.

PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT

Although the judicial and legislative abrogation of the common
law interspousal exception is a critical step toward protecting married individuals from violent sexual assault by their spouses, enforcement of sexual battery statutes in interspousal cases remains
difficult. Conceding that the importance of the Smith decision
should not be underplayed, the successful application of the newly
imposed criminal liability depends on the resolution of two
obstacles.
First, the victim of spousal rape will be faced with many of the
same problems as is the victim of extrafamilial rape.6 Societal
pressures and the threat of personal embarrassment militate
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (1956).
57. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(b) (1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 750.520(L) (1975); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.349 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1 (1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-3709 (1979); WIS. STAT. § 940.225(6) (1979).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 11.45.445(1) (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409(2) (1973); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6107(2) (1977); IOWA CODE § 709.4 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(E) (1977).
59. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-30 (1981).
60. Florida is not included in this total pending resolution of the issue by the Florida
Supreme Court.
61. See generally L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL
REACTIONS (1978).
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against disclosure by the victim. 2 Police and prosecutors are reluctant to aggresively enforce the laws because of the poor prospects
for conviction and the difficulties of proof," and trial of the assailant may often seem like trial of the victim." These disincentives to
enforcement are compounded in the context of interspousal sexual
battery by the difficulty of disproving consent. Studies demonstrate that the defense of consent is raised almost as a matter of
course in extrafamilial rape cases. 65 It would seem safe to assume
that the defense would be almost universally asserted, and in many
cases successfully so, in interspousal cases.
Furthermore, the victim of interspousal sexual battery will be
forced to confront the myriad of fears and difficulties which prevent victims of other types of spousal abuse from seeking and obtaining remedies through the criminal justice system." The reluctance of police and prosecutors to interfere with "family matters"
is well documented. 67 Another exacerbating factor is that the decision by an abused spouse to seek legal assistance is made almost
universally only after all hope for preserving the marriage has vanished." Few marriages can be expected to survive a criminal
charge brought and prosecuted by one spouse against another.
This must certainly be a negative consideration for any spouse
considering filing charges.
The problem of initial disclosure by an abused spouse is often
further complicated by the presence of children in the home. The
decision to leave an abusive husband, difficult in any case, is often
impossible for an otherwise unskilled housewife with children. In
such cases, the only viable alternative may be to accept the abuse,
perhaps rationalizing it by balancing the relative security of the
marriage against the uncertainties of abandoning it. 69
Additionally, studies show that an abused spouse's failure to
even report her plight is often caused by her own expectations of
abuse.7 In some cases, abused spouses feel that their treatment is
deserved, that it is the only form of acknowledgement available,
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 30-34.
Id.
Id. at 157-220.
Id. at 171-75.

66.
67.

See generally, R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS (1977).
Id.; see also, J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE (1979); T. DAVISON, CONJUGAL VIO-

LENCE (1978).
68. LANGLEY & LEVY,

69.
70.

Id. at 113.
Id. at 112-14.

supra note 66, at 111-25.
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and that it is normal behavior. These studies further indicate that
a pattern of violence within a marriage makes disclosure to the
proper authorities unlikely.7"
It seems clear then that although the Smith decision is the sine
qua non for equitable enforcement of the sexual battery statute in
interspousal cases, it is not in itself a cure for the problem. A truly
meaningful resolution depends on fundamental changes in the way
society and the legal system envisions and treats women, and a recognition of the fact that violent sexual assault is neither the
"right" of the attacker nor the fault of the victim. 7 2 Until these

basic changes are made, sexual battery in all cases remains essentially a wrong for which there is no real remedy. Notwithstanding
the noble aspirations of the Fifth District, the Smith decision
serves only to raise spousal rape victims to the level of injustice
suffered by all victims of sexual assault.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Smith, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized that the
purpose of the sexual battery statute was to prevent and punish "a
crime of violence, not a crime of sex."73 Assuming, arguendo, that
marriage carries with it an implied consent to submit to sexual intercourse, it does not imply consent to forcible, violent sexual assault. Although the decision is by no means a cure-all for the problem of spousal rape, the Fifth District Court of Appeal should be
applauded for refusing to blindly apply an outdated common law
principle.
KENNETH MCLAUGHLIN

71.
72.

Id. at 113-14.
For an interesting comparative study, see MAIDMENT, THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO MARITAL VIOLENCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE U.S.A., FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY (J. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1978).
73. 401 So. 2d at 1129.

